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ABSTRACT
We investigated the association between socially responsible investment, internal financing 
sources, and access to bank financing in the production industry of India. Using a survey 
research design, owners of small production firms were asked about their perceptions 
regarding socially responsible investment, internal financing sources, and access to bank 
financing. We found that socially responsible investment and internal financing sources help 
owners of small production firms improve access to bank financing. This study contributes 
to the literature on the relationship between socially responsible investment, internal 
financing sources, and access to bank financing. The findings may be useful for financial 
managers, production firm owners, investors, consultants, and other stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
Indian production firms face numerous conflicts with government and society 
including, but not limited to, pollution, environmental degradation, child 
and other labor exploitation, gambling, tobacco, alcohol and other social and 
environmental issues (Nambiar & Chitty, 2014; Bengtsson, 2008; Star, 2008; 
Arjalies, 2010; Brimble, Vyvyan & Ng, 2013). Agricultural production firms face 
conflicts related to negative externalities of food production, moral concerns, 
alcohol abuse and other health-related issues, the use of genetically modified 
organisms which society considers an unethical practice, animal welfare, pesticide 
residues, corruption, poor corporate governance, poor working conditions in the 
meat industry and meat scandals (Heyder & Theuvsen, 2012). These conflicts 
cause agency problems between the firm (agent) and stakeholders such as the 
government and society (principal). 
Because retail banks (banks that deals with small business financing) 
are controlled by the central bank and the government (The Economist, 2013), 
agency problems create barriers to bank financing. Considering the negative 
impact of conflicts with government and society on the firm, modern firms in 
various industries have become increasingly active in improving corporate social 
performance by increasing socially responsible investment (Wang & Berens, 
2015). Socially responsible investment is a part of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) of the firm. Chen (2011) described four components of CSR as corporate 
accountability (i.e., the firm is accountable for its own actions under a social 
structure), openness (i.e., the firm should have open communication with 
stakeholders about its actions), transparency (i.e., the firm should minimize 
information asymmetry about its actions), and competitiveness (i.e., the firm 
should compete honestly in the market). All these components minimize agency 
problems between the firm and its stakeholders. Ethical investing, health, safety, 
and pollution prevention are among the most important components of socially 
responsible investment (Mill, 2006; Tsai, Chou, & Hsu, 2009). Following the 
above components, we define socially responsible investment, in the context 
of this study, as the extent to which owners of small production firms avoid 
investing in new ventures that produce alcohol, tobacco, and weapons; make 
well-planned investments to avoid environmental degradation; and make socially 
responsible investment to create a better life for future generations. Lahiri (2012, 
p. 4) classified micro, small, and medium enterprises (MMSEs) based on their 
limits for investment in plant, machinery and equipment for manufacturing and 
production enterprises in India (Table 1).
Small business firms are financially constrained (Joeveer, 2013) and 
encounter barriers to accessing bank credit (Sandhu, Hussain & Matlay, 2012). 
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Because the Central Bank of India is risk averse and controls Indian retail banks 
(The Economist, 2013), production firms tend to borrow from private financial 
institutions that have more relaxed requirements but charge very high interest 
rates (Gill, Mand, Obradovich & Mathur, 2015). For example, banks offer crop 
production loans for the agricultural industry at 7% annually, while private 
moneylenders charge between 20% to 30% (Ghosal & Ray, 2015).
Table 1
Classification of micro, small and medium enterprises in India.
Enterprise Investment in Plant and Equipment
Micro Enterprises Does not exceed twenty five lakh (2.5 million) rupees.
Small Enterprises More than twenty five lakh (2.5 million) rupees but does not exceed 
five crore rupees.
Medium Enterprises More than five crore (50 million) rupees but does not exceed ten crore 
(100 million) rupees.
Note: For the simplicity, we considered all the firms (micro and small) with investment in plant and equipment 
less than five crore rupees (50 million rupees) in the manufacturing industry as small business firms.
Since the world financial crisis and economic difficulties of 2008–2009, 
credit access has been increasingly restricted to firms that are relatively stronger 
financially with low debt to equity ratios (Wu, Guan & Myers, 2014). The higher 
chances of bankruptcy in the small business industry make Indian banks risk 
averse. Internal financing sources reduce the chances of bankruptcy (Philosophov 
& Philosophov, 2005) and thus, improve access to bank financing. To examine 
the associations between the socially responsible investment, internal financing 
sources, and access to bank financing, this study posited the following research 
questions: 
Do owners of small production firms perceive socially responsible 
investment to be associated with improved access to bank 
financing?
Do owners of small production firms perceive internal financing 
sources to be associated with improved access to bank financing?
A previous study by Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) concentrated 
on publicly traded firms to test the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and access to financing in China and found that corporate social 
responsibility performance reduces capital constraints. We find that socially 
responsible investment and internal financing sources help owners of small 
production firms improve access to bank financing in the production industry of 
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India. Thus, by lending some support to the findings of Cheng et al. (2014) related 
to publicly traded firms, this study contributes to the literature on the relationship 
between socially responsible investment, internal financing sources, and access 
to bank financing. 
Socially responsible investment indeed increases cognitive legitimacy 
(Scott, 1994) of production firms (i.e., perceptions that actions of the production 
firms are appropriate) in the eyes of lending institutions and thus, improves an 
access to bank financing. We also find that production firms can attain normative 
legitimacy (Scott, 1995) by increasing socially responsible investment to signal 
corporate social responsibility, assuming banks value it to make lending decisions 
in the small business industry. Since socially responsible investment improves 
access to bank financing by reducing agency problems between the firm and 
its stakeholders, we strongly recommend to have a written corporate policy for 
socially responsible investment.    
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
It is commonly agreed that corporate social performance (i.e., social welfare 
actions taken by corporations) improves the reputation of firms; therefore, modern 
firms in various industries have become increasingly engaged in activities aimed at 
doing good for society (Wang & Berens, 2015). For example, socially responsible 
investment helps reduce environmental degradation, gambling problems, issues 
related to tobacco and alcohol, and other social and environmental problems that 
a society faces (Bengtsson, 2008; Star, 2008; Arjalies, 2010; Brimble et al., 2013). 
Socially responsible investment can reduce agency problems between 
borrowers and lending institutions. Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2008) 
described that socially responsible investors select firms with sound social and 
environmental records and expect companies to focus on social welfare. However, 
it is difficult for the principal (i.e., banks) to monitor the actions of the agents (i.e., 
firms) where there exists information asymmetry (Zinga, Augusto, & Ramos, 
2013). In the context of this study, small business firms (agents) have better 
information about their actions related to investments which can lead conflict. In 
such circumstances, agency costs arise representing the cost of all activities and 
operating systems designed to align the interests and/or actions of small business 
firms (agents) with the interests of banks (principals) to avoid unethical activities 
and to increase socially responsible investment.  
It is well known that small businesses are financially constrained (Joeveer, 
2013). These constraints cause an inability of the firm to obtain financing from 
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banks and issue equity to raise capital (Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo, 2001). 
Stein (2003) found that capital constraints play an important role in affecting 
the firm’s ability to undertake major investment decisions. Cheng et al. (2014) 
found that firms with better corporate social responsibility performance face 
significantly lower capital constraints. Since socially responsible investment is 
part of corporate social performance, it can lower capital constraints by providing 
access to bank credit for small businesses in the production industry. 
Previous studies also showed that superior corporate social responsibility 
performance engages stakeholders to minimize opportunistic behaviour of the 
firm (Benabou & Tirole, 2010) and motivates firms to disclose their corporate 
social responsibility activities to the market (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011). 
This demonstrates their long-term focus and thus, allows them to differentiate 
themselves from firms without superior corporate social responsibility 
performance (Benabou & Tirole, 2010). 
Cheng et al. (2014) showed that increased availability of data related to 
corporate social responsibility performance reduces informational asymmetry 
between the firm and investors, which in turn lowers capital constraints. 
Thus, reporting superior corporate social responsibility performance (socially 
responsible investment in the context of this study) lowers agency costs through 
stakeholder engagement and increased transparency, which in turn improves 
access to bank financing. In summary, the literature review indicates that socially 
responsible investment positively affects access to bank financing; therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H1: Owners of small production firms perceive socially responsible 
investment to be associated with improved access to bank 
financing.
Internal financing sources play an important role in improving access 
to bank financing by reducing the chances of bankruptcy. Pecking order theory 
of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that firms use internally 
generated funds in the form of retained earnings. These internal financing sources 
reduce risk of bankruptcy by requiring less debt in the capital structure. Thus, 
pecking order theory is particularly relevant for small businesses that typically 
have more difficulty obtaining external financing (Ang, 1991). Uyar and 
Guzelyurt (2015) found that small-to-medium enterprise (SMEs) primarily prefer 
internal funding sources over external ones and short-term debt over long-term 
debt in Turkey. Authors also found that during general economic conditions, debt-
paying ability of the firm and financial distress risk play the most important role 
in outside financing decisions.
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Small firms are usually riskier than larger corporate borrowers (Jacobson, 
Linde, & Roszbach, 2005) and face external financing challenges. Therefore, 
initially small business firms use internal funding generated through profitable 
operations to finance operations and investments. After internal funds are 
exhausted, firms use debt financing before resorting to external capital (Bhaird 
Mac an & Lucey, 2010). The findings of Wahyudi (2014) suggest that cash flow, 
capacity, and leverage are the major determinants of default in the micro, small, 
and medium sized firms. 
While new enterprises are likely to prefer low cost and less risky or less 
formal financing such as internal financing (Osei-Assibey, Bokpin, & Twerefou, 
2012), firms with greater internal financing are likely to have lower leverage, 
higher cash ratios, and suffer a lower impact from a crisis on their business 
operations (Bancel & Mittoo, 2011). Since internal financing sources reduce the 
chances of bankruptcy (Philosophov & Philosophov, 2005), they increase chances 
of access to bank financing. The findings of Coco and Pignataro (2012) showed 
that less wealthy borrowers face greater difficulty in obtaining loans. In summary, 
internal financing sources reduce the chances of bankruptcy. Hence the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Owners of small production firms perceive internal financing 
sources to be associated with improved access to bank 
financing.
METHODOLOGY
Research Design
This study utilises survey research (a non-experimental field study design) and 
interview data collection methods. The questionnaire used in the survey is shown 
in Appendix A.
Variables and Their Measurement
To remain consistent with previous research, the measurement of socially 
responsible investment was adopted from Turker (2008) and the evaluation of 
small production firm performance was adopted from Zehir, Acar, and Tanriverdi 
(2006). Note that to reduce heteroscedasticity (i.e., stabilize variance), the natural 
logarithm (ln) was calculated (Bowerman, Schermer, Johnson, O’Connell, & 
Murphee, 2014, p. 422) for: Firm size, firm age, owner age, and owner experience 
variables.
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Bank financing. Bank financing (BF) is measured as a categorical variable. If the 
owner of small production firm borrowed from a bank, BF is given the value of 
1; otherwise BF equals 0.
Socially responsible investment. Socially responsible investment (SRI) is the 
general perception of the owners of small production firms about the extent to 
which they invest in socially responsible small production firms. Following the 
definition, we selected five separate components to measure the SRI index. In the 
survey, all participants were asked to rate the extent to which they (i) avoid investing 
in new ventures that produce alcohol, (ii) avoid investing in new ventures that 
produce tobacco, (iii) avoid investing in new ventures that produce weapons, (iv) 
make well-planned investments to avoid environmental degradation, and (v) make 
socially responsible investment to create a better life for future generations. Their 
responses were categorised on a five-point Likert Scale assigning 5 as “Strongly 
Agree” and 1 as “Strongly Disagree”. Responses were initially collected for each 
of the above five sources of SRI. The five measures are highly correlated with 
correlation values ranging from 0.66 to 0.92. Therefore, we constructed a new 
index by using principal component analysis (PCA). The SRI index is constructed 
using the first component, which explains approximately 84.73% of the variation.
Internal financing sources. Internal financing sources (IFS) measure small 
production firm owner’s capacity to invest his or her personal and family assets in 
his or her own small production firm. IFS is measured as a dummy variable where 
IFS = 1 if the owner of small production firm has adequate internal (personal and 
family) financing sources to invest in a small production firm. Alternatively, IFS = 
0 if the owner of small production firm does not have adequate internal (personal 
and family) financing sources to invest in a small production firm.
Firm size. Firm size (F_SIZE) is a categorical variable. In the survey, we identified 
five different firm sizes as follows: (i) INR 0 – INR 500,000, (ii) INR 500,001 
– INR1,000,000, (iii) INR1,000,001 – INR2,000,000, (iv) INR2,000,001 – 
INR3,000,000, and (v) more than INR3,000,001. During the survey, respondents 
chose only one category to which the average sales of their business belong. For 
empirical analyses, the natural logarithm (ln) of average sales was calculated. To 
calculate the natural logarithm (ln) for category five, INR3,000,001 was used.
Firm age. Firm age (F_AGE) is measured as the actual age of a small production 
firm. For empirical analyses, the natural logarithm (ln) of actual age of small 
production firms was calculated. 
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Duality. Duality (DUAL) is a dummy variable with assigned value of 1 if the 
owner of small production firm is both CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors 
in the same company, 0 otherwise. 
Small production firm performance. The definition of small production firm 
performance (SPFP) for the purposes of this study is the general perception 
of the owners of small production firms about the changes in net profit margin 
(DNPM), return on investment (DROI), and cash flow from operations (DCFO) of 
their small production firms. Following the definition, we selected three separate 
components to measure the SPFP index. In the survey, we asked all participants to 
rate the extent to which they believe there are changes in (i) net profit margin, (ii) 
return on investment, and (iii) cash flow from operations of their small production 
firms. Their responses were categorized on a five-point Likert Scale assigning 5 
as “Highest” and 1 as “Lowest”. Responses were initially collected for each of the 
above three sources of small production firm performance. The three measures are 
highly correlated with correlation values ranging from 0.82 to 0.91. Therefore, we 
constructed a new index by using PCA. The SPFP index is constructed using the 
first component, which explains approximately 90.96% of the variation.
Owner age. Owner age (O_AGE) is measured as the actual age of the owner of 
small production firm. For empirical analyses, the natural logarithm (ln) of actual 
age of the owners of small production firms was calculated.  
Owner education. The education of the owner of small production firm (O_
EDU) is a categorical variable with an assigned value of 1 = High school or less, 
2 = College diploma, 3 = Bachelor’s degree, 4 = Master’s degree, and 5 = PhD 
degree or more. 
Owner experience. Owner’s years of experience (O_EXP) is measured as the 
actual number of years of owner experience. For empirical analyses, the natural 
logarithm (ln) of average number of years’ experience was calculated. 
Female gender. Owner female gender (FEM) is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the owners of small production firms report that they are female.  
Sampling
We targeted the owners of small production firms from Punjab, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, and other states of India to ask about their perceptions regarding 
socially responsible investment, internal financing sources, and access to bank 
financing. Telephone directories and referrals from friends, family members, 
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religious places such as temples, and relatives were used to prepare an extensive 
list of names of the owners of small production firms and their telephone numbers 
to distribute surveys and to conduct telephone interviews.  
Given that the population is “abstract” [i.e., it is not possible to obtain 
a list of all members of the focal population] (Huck, 2008, p. 101), a non-
probability (purposive) sample was obtained. In a purposive sample, participants 
are screened for inclusion based on criteria associated with members of the focal 
population. We chose this method because Indian owners of the small production 
firms were reluctant to participate in the research because of the lack of time due 
to their personal and business responsibilities. Therefore, there was the possibility 
of sampling bias (the threat to representational ability of a sample). To avoid 
sampling bias, we chose research participants who were indeed representative of 
the population for the study. 
Although we targeted Haryana, Rajasthan, and other states of India, 
the majority of surveys came from the Punjab state of India because of the 
lack of cooperation from the other research participants. The sample included 
approximately 1,100 research participants. A total of 322 surveys were completed 
over the telephone, through personal visits, or received by e-mail and three of 
them were non-usable. Thus, the response rate was roughly 29%. We assumed the 
remaining cases similar to the selected research participants. Out of 322 surveys, 
only three surveys came from Haryana and six surveys came from Rajasthan; 
therefore, surveys from Haryana and Rajasthan were included in surveys that 
came from Punjab state.
Common method bias does not appear to be a problem because variables 
used in this study, although self-reported, are largely measured objectively. 
Nevertheless, a factor analysis (e.g., Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) indicated that 
common method bias does not seem to be a concern for this study.
Confidentiality 
To solve confidentiality issues, we assured all subjects that their personal 
identification including names would not be disclosed during the analysis, 
interpretation, and publication of data. Before conducting the telephone interviews, 
all subjects received instruction regarding the purpose of the research, and asked for 
their permission to use the data provided. Any information obtained in connection 
with this study and that can identify specific respondents is confidential and will 
be disclosed only with subjects’ permission or as required by law. 
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EMPIRICAL MODELS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Empirical Models  
The socially responsible investment (SRI) and internal financing sources (IFS) 
affect access to bank financing. Socially responsible investment helps mitigate an 
agency and asymmetric information problem between the firm and stakeholders 
such as banks, governments, and society. Internal financing sources help reduce the 
chances of bankruptcy. Therefore, we consider SRI and IFS as main explanatory 
variables in access to bank financing, and all other variables are considered 
individual control variables in the following main regression model: 
BFi = α0 + α1.SRIi + α2.IFSi + ∑βiXi + εi (1)
In the Equation (1), i refers to individual small business production firm, 
BFi is access to bank financing of small business production firm i, and Xi represents 
individual control variables corresponding to firm i. εi is a normally distributed 
disturbance term. In the estimated model, α1 and α2 measure the magnitude at 
which SRI and IFS affect access to bank financing. We extend the above model 
by considering different set of control variables one at a time. The coefficients of 
variables of Model (1) are estimated by applying logistic regression method. We 
used firm size (F_SIZE), firm age (F_AGE), CEO duality (DUAL), small business 
performance (DSPFP), owner age (O_AGE), owner education (O_EDU), owner 
experience (O_EXP), and female gender (FEM) as control variables. Equation (1) 
is relevant for testing H1 and H2.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows a series of descriptive statistics. In the dataset, some of the variables, 
except SRI and DSPFP indices, are individual dummy/categorical variables. The 
data exhibits that the distribution of SRI and DSPFP is almost symmetrical around 
their mean values and thus there is no outlier present in either of the indices. 
Value of skewness for all the scales used in this study are within the range of 
−0.752 to −1.153, which is an excellent range. According to Mason, Lind, and 
Marchal (1991), values of skewness usually ranges from −3 to +3 when the data 
are normally distributed. 
Table 2 also shows the differences in variables among individual firms 
with bank financing and with private financing. Findings show that i) internal 
financing sources for the small production firms with bank financing are 
significantly higher compared to those with private financing (mean 0.84 versus 
0.32); (ii) SRI is significantly higher among small production firms with bank 
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financing compared to those with private financing (mean 0.22 versus −0.53); 
(iii) financial performance of the small production firms with bank financing is 
significantly higher compared to those with private financing (mean 0.23 versus 
−0.57); (iv) firm size of the small production firms with bank financing is larger 
than those with private financing; and (v) education level of the owners of the 
small production firms with bank financing is much higher than those with 
private financing, all differences are significant at the 1% level. Similarly, t-test 
results show that (i) firm age of the small production firms with bank financing is 
slightly lower compared to those with private financing (mean 2.47 versus 2.91); 
and (ii) the CEO duality in the small production firms with bank financing is 
slightly higher compared to those with private financing (mean 0.73 versus 0.57), 
all differences are significant at the five percent level. Likewise, higher number 
of small production firms with bank financing are managed by male owners 
compared to those with private financing (mean 0.89 versus 0.80), difference is 
significant at the five percent level.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
To reduce dimensionality (i.e., to reduce number of variables), we used principal 
component analysis. According to Pereira and Sassi (2012), principal component 
analysis is one of the most popular methods for dimensionality reduction of a 
feature set. As shown in Table 3, factor analysis extracts two factors (denoted as 
Component 1 and Component 2) and all the items loaded on the expected factors. 
This shows that common factor bias is not a concern. Varimax rotation explains 
87.42% of the variance in the original scores. The test statistic for Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO), a Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 0.83. Kaiser (1974, p. 36) 
suggests accepting values greater than 0.50 as indicative of the validity of factor 
analysis. 
We analyse each question subset to calculate the weighted factor 
scores. The variables constructed through factor analysis (SRI and DSPFP) are 
standardised, and therefore they all have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 by 
construction. The first principal component is strongly correlated with five of 
the original variables: SRI1, SRI2, SRI3, SRI4, and SRI5. The second principal 
component increases with only three of the values: DSPFP1, DSPFP2, and 
DSPFP3. We can conclude that principal component analysis allows using an 
aggregate variable for each factor. We also computed Cronbach alphas on the 
above indicated clusters of items: SRI 0.943; and DSPFP 0.965.
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Table 3
Rotated component matrix a, b
Component
1 2
SRI
My firm…:
SRI1)…Avoids investing in new ventures that lead to alcohol production. 0.945 0.116
SRI2)…Avoids investing in new ventures that lead to tobacco production. 0.945 0.098
SRI3)…Avoids investing in new ventures that lead to weapons production. 0.926 0.114
SRI4)…Makes well-planned investments to avoid environmental 
degradation.
0.885 0.254
SRI5)…Makes socially responsible investment to create a better life for 
future generations.
0.819 0.273
DSPFP
On the average, over the past 3 years how much did the …?
DSPFP1)…Net profit margin of your small business change? 0.192 0.931
DSPFP2)…Return on investment of your small business change? 0.177 0.951
DSPFP3)…Cash flow of your small business from operations change? 0.136 0.930
Notes: a Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation
Rotation converged in 3 iterations
b Varimax Rotation = 87.42%
Pearson Bivariate Correlation Analysis
The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that SRI, IFS, F_SIZE, DUAL, DSPFP, 
and O_EDU (ρSRI, BF = 0.339; ρIFS, BF = 0.510; ρF_SIZE, BF = 0.257; ρDUAL, BF = 0.162; 
ρDSPFP, BF = 0.364; and ρO_EDU, BF = 0.333) are positively and significantly correlated 
with BF, suggesting that socially responsible investment, internal financing 
sources, firm size, CEO duality, changes in small production firm performance, 
and owner education positively influence the access to bank financing in India. 
Likewise, the correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that F_AGE (ρFA, BF = 
−0.193) is negatively and significantly correlated with BF, implying that firm age 
negatively influence the access to bank financing in India (see Table 4). 
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Regression Results and Discussion 
Socially responsible investment, internal financing sources, and access to bank 
financing
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation (1). The findings show that 
SRI, IFS, DSPFP, and O_EDU positively affect the access to bank financing in the 
Indian small business production industry. 
The coefficients of SRI in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (9), (10), and (11) of 
BF are positive and significant at the 1%, 1%, 1%, 1%, 5%, 1%, and 5% level, 
respectively, implying that socially responsible investment positively affects the 
access to bank financing in the Indian small business production industry. Thus, 
H1 is supported.
Likewise, the coefficients of IFS in columns (5) to (11) of BF are positive 
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that internal financing sources positively 
affects the access to bank financing in the Indian small business production 
industry. Thus H2 is supported.
Regardless of individual model specifications, we find significant and 
positive coefficients of SRI and IFS suggesting that socially responsible investment 
and internal financing sources improve the access to bank financing in the Indian 
small business production industry. This finding remains robust when we consider 
all control variables together (refer to model specification 11). 
The coefficients of F_SIZE in columns (2) and (4) of BF are positive 
and significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively, indicating that firm size 
positively affects the access to bank financing in the Indian small business 
production industry. The coefficients of F_AGE in columns (2), (6) and (9) of BF 
are negative and significant at the 5%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, indicating 
that firm age negatively affects the access to bank financing in the Indian small 
business production industry. Likewise, the coefficients of DUAL in columns (6) 
and (8) of BF are positive and significant at the 10% level, indicating that CEO 
duality positively affects the access to bank financing in the Indian small business 
production industry. Similarly, the coefficients of DSPFP in columns (2), (4), (6), 
(8), (9) and (11) of BF are positive and significant at the 1%, 1%, 5%, 5%, 5% 
and 5% level, respectively, implying that positive change in small production firm 
performance positively affects the access to bank financing in the Indian small 
business production industry. 
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The coefficients of O_AGE in columns (3) and (4) of BF are positive and 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that owner age positively affects the access 
to bank financing in the Indian small business production industry. Similarly, the 
coefficients of O_EDU in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (10), and (11) of BF are 
positive and significant at the 1%, 1%, 1%, 5%, 1% and 5% level, respectively, 
implying that owner education positively affects the access to bank financing in 
the Indian small business production industry.  
Summary of findings, discussion, conclusion, and recommendations 
The results suggest that the access to bank financing is positively associated 
with socially responsible investment, internal financing sources, change in small 
production firm performance, and education. Thus, the findings of this study lend 
some support to the findings of Cheng et al. (2014) related to publicly traded 
firms in that socially responsible investment improves access to bank financing in 
the small business production industry. The findings also support the findings of 
Philosophov and Philosophov (2005) in that internal financing sources increase 
the chances of access to bank financing.  
In summary, socially responsible investment and internal financing 
sources improve access to bank financing in the small business production 
industry of India. Socially responsible investment increases the chances of bank 
financing by е0.752 – 1, е0.494 – 1, е0.674 – 1, and е0.459 – 1, or 112.12%, 63.88%, 
96.21%, and 63.23%, respectively in India. The improvement in the chances of 
bank financing may be because socially responsible investment reduces agency 
problems between the firm and its stakeholders such as shareholders, government, 
and society. The findings of Ramasamy, Ting, and Yeung (2007) also indicated 
that firms with socially responsible investment may outperform their counterparts 
when stakeholders value corporate social responsibility. 
Internal financing sources reduce chances of bankruptcy; therefore, 
internal financing sources increase the chances of bank financing by е2.412 – 1, 
е1.931 – 1, е2.116 – 1, and е1.781 – 1,  or 10.16 time, 5.90 times, 7.30 times, and 4.93 
times, respectively in India (see Table 4). While firm size, firm performance, 
owner age, and owner education increases chances of bank financing, firm age 
decrease chances of bank financing. This may be because older firms do not pay 
much attention to the socially responsible investment.  
The findings of this study provide a critical policy recommendation 
suggesting that socially responsible investment can be useful in emerging countries 
where agency problems between firm and stakeholders such as shareholders, 
government, and society are high. While the basis of the results rests on small 
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production firms located in India, the findings may also be applicable to similar 
entities of other emerging markets.
Since the findings of this study show that perceived socially responsible 
investment positively impacts the bank financing, socially responsible investment 
favors both the firm and stakeholders such as shareholders, government, and 
society. Since socially responsible investment helps reduce social concerns 
and at the same time helps improve the chances of growth and prosperity of 
small production firms, we strongly recommend to have a corporate policy for 
the socially responsible investment. Socially responsible investment should be 
increased by the small production firms. Indian government should also support 
socially responsible investment by granting low interest loans and by providing 
subsidies to the production firms.  
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH
Managerial Implications 
The higher level of perceived valuation of socially responsible investment and 
internal financing sources indicate a higher level of perceived access to bank 
financing and vice versa.  
Limitations
This is a co-relational study that investigates the association between socially 
responsible investment and access to bank financing, and association between 
internal financing sources and access to bank financing. There is not necessarily 
a causal relationship between the two. The findings of this study may only be 
generalised to firms similar to those that were included in this research.
This study is limited to perceptions and judgments that asked for 
responses from fixed format, set-question survey tools. The respondents were 
unable to provide additional input because a survey questionnaire was used to 
collect data. The sample size is also small. A mail/drop-off survey data collection 
method contributed to a low response rate or response error. Some favorable 
techniques such as including postage-paid mail, sending a cover letter, providing 
a deadline for returning the survey, and promising anonymity were applied in 
order to increase the response rate. 
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Future Research
The generalisability of results and implications of this study also require further 
research of both a quantitative and qualitative nature, conducted not only in 
other Indian regions but also in other countries. Future study can improve the 
methodological focus and framework by collecting data from a larger number of 
firms.
NOTES
1. Agency theory was pioneered by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
2. The eigenvalues of the five principal components are 4.237, 0.525, 0.085, 0.079, and 
0.074, and the corresponding variances are 84.730%, 10.509%, 1.709%, 1.577%, 
and 1.474%, respectively with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.954. As a result, SRI index is 
constructed using the first component. Factors that have eigenvalues greater than one 
are included in the construction of the component (Kaiser, 1960).  
3. The eigenvalues of the three principal components are 2.729, 0.189, and 0.083, 
and the corresponding variances are 90.961%, 6.286%, and 2.753%, respectively 
with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.950. As a result, SPFP index is constructed using the 
first component. Factors that have eigenvalues greater than one are included in the 
construction of the component (Kaiser, 1960).
4. Production firms face numerous conflicts with society and government (Heyder & 
Theuvsen, 2012); therefore, we chose these firms for our study.
5. Bank financing is a binary variable; therefore, we used logistic regression method.
6. George and Mallery (2003) provide the following rules of thumb for Cronbach's 
alpha values: > 0.90 excellent, > 0.80 good, > 0.70 acceptable, > 0.60 questionable, 
> 0.50 poor, and < 0.50 unacceptable (p. 231).
7. The lowest tolerance is 0.422 and the highest VIF is 2.369 indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a serious issue.
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APPENDIX A
Survey questionnaire
1) Where do you obtain financing from?
Bank(s) Private lending institutions
2) Do you have adequate internal (personal and family) financing sources to 
invest in new venture?
No Yes
3) Please indicate average sales (Rupees) of the firm per year:
0 – 500,000 500,001 – 1,000,000 1,000,001 – 2,000,000
2,000,001 – 3,000,000 3,000,001 or more
4) Please indicate the age of your firm:
Firm Age:  Years
5) Is the owner the chairperson of the directors (decision makers) in the firm?
Yes No
6) Please indicate the age of the owner/director/CEO:
Age of the Owner/Director/CEO:  Years
7) Please indicate the highest level of the owner’s/director’s/CEO’s education: 
High school or less College diploma Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree PhD degree or more
8) Please indicate the number of years the owner/director/CEO has been involved 
in this business:
Owner/Director/CEO Experience:  Years
9) Please indicate the gender of the owner/director of the firm:
Male Female
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10) Socially Responsible Investment
Strongly 
disagree Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree Agree
Strongly 
agree
My firm avoids investing in the 
new ventures that produce alcohol.
My firm avoids investing in the 
new ventures that produce tobacco.
My firm avoids investing in 
the new ventures that produce 
weapons.
My firm makes well-planned 
investments to avoid environmental 
degradation.
My firm makes socially responsible 
investment to create a better life for 
future generations.
11) Small Production Firm Performance
Gone down 
a lot
Gone down  
a little
Stayed 
approximately 
the same
Gone up 
a little
Gone up 
a lot
On the average, over the last 3 
years in what direction and to 
what degree do you perceive 
the net profit margin changed?
On the average, over the last 3 
years in what direction and to 
what degree do you perceive 
the return on investment 
changed?
On the average, over the last 3 
years in what direction and to 
what degree do you perceive 
the cash flow from operations 
changed?
